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1. Introduction 
At present, there are 195 countries in the world, recognised by the United Nations1 and about one-
fifth of all of the States are landlocked.2 Accordingly, it can be said that the majority has a right to comment 
on the maritime-based issues such as maritime delimitation, protection of the maritime environment, 
maintenance of international peace and security at sea. Among these issues, the delimitation of maritime 
zones has to be considered as a priority in order to avoid possible disputes and uncertainties since it is 
directly related to the right to utilize sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction and to exploit resources.3 
In principle, whilst defining the jurisdictional range of the coastal State over marine spaces, the 
distance of the State from the coast is accepted as the primary determinant of the maritime boundary.4 
Before 1945, maritime zones were all about the territorial sea that was around three miles in breadth, and 
apart from exceptions the need for boundaries was limited.5 After 1945, the previous approach was changed 
with the emergence of the scarcity of land-based natural resources and the realization of the hidden potential 
of the high seas as well.6 Thus, in order to increase the States’ radius of action, the new maritime zones 
were established, such as continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. As a result, these innovations 
provided a fertile environment for conducting the new trend, however, in many cases, due to geographic 
configurations and proximity, expansion of the zones posed delimitation problem between the States that 
appeared in the form of overlapping or converging of the maritime spaces.7 In other words, with the 
exception of appropriate conjuncture, if each State requests equal maritime zones irrespective of the 
conditions in question, a conflict of interest will inevitably arise. 
There is no doubt that maritime delimitation has a vexatious character that includes amputation of 
the area at stake, and parties have to endure the consequences of the process. That is to say; each party 
have to face the sacrifices to make in order to reach an equilibrium point, but the question is whether there is 
a perfect prescription to implement by excluding current political or economic powers of the parties and 
focusing the real facts of the dispute or not?8 In this regard, some international conferences, namely, the 
                                                 
1 'Member States' (Un.org, 2019) <https://www.un.org/en/member-states/> accessed 15 June 2019. 
2 'Landlocked Countries' (Worldpopulationreview.com, 2019) 
<http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/landlocked-countries/> accessed 15 June 2019. 
3 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Love, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn, Manchester University Press 1999), 181. 
4 Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press 2012), 186. 
5 Ibid (n 3) 181. 
6 Nugzar Dundua, 'Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries between Adjacent States' (Un.org, 2006), 1. 
<https://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/dundua_0607_
georgia.pdf> accessed 17 June 2019. 
7 Igor V Karaman, Dispute Resolution in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012), 169. 
8 Prosper Weil, The Law Of Maritime Delimitation: Reflections (Grotius Publications Limited 1989), 5. 
7 
 
1958 Geneva Convention and 1982 Law of the Sea Convention were organised in order to codify, clarify and 
consolidate pre-existing rules of international customary law as well as meeting the needs of States’ interests 
by considering the technological progress.9 Besides, the international courts and arbitral tribunals have made 
significant contributions to the process of delimitation by including some fundamental principles into their 
decisions that they have established over time. Notwithstanding, maritime delimitation still has a paradoxical 
nature, and there are numbers of factors to be dealt with such as a source of authority, principal methods, 
dispute settlement process and technical challenges in order to form an equation that might be able to reach 
a solution.10 
Despite the existence of current delimitation methodology and the successful delimitation 
implementations in the North, the Baltic, the Black and the Caribbean seas, it is a fact that no single ocean or 
sea that have been wholly delimited so far.11 Moreover, as in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, a unique and 
complex geographical and political structure can be seen in some regions that make the situation even 
worse. Furthermore, some recent studies have indicated that the Eastern Mediterranean has a considerable 
amount of undiscovered natural gas potential that might be able to ensure European energy security.12 
Therefore, the area at stake entails strategic and critical concerns not only for the Eastern Mediterranean 
region but also for Europe. 
The States in the Eastern Mediterranean coast have their own agendas and different assertions in 
terms of maritime delimitation to achieve their goals. Among those, Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern 
Cyprus (GCASC), Greece, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkey have a problematic 
relationship which creates a major impediment to be eliminated for a successful delimitation. Despite the 
unsettled structure of the region, GCASC has already started to make bilateral agreements as well as 
issuing gas exploration licences to the multinational companies without considering the rights of TRNC and 
Turkey. On the contrary, Turkey has adopted an approach that on the basis of rejecting all bilateral 
delimitation agreements concluded by other parties as well as conducting its own gas exploration with owned 
ships by taking the principle of reciprocity as a reference. In this regard, Turkey has seemed like the one who 
has an irreconcilable character, and its claims as well as actions are always assessed as irrational and 
unlawful by world public opinion.  
                                                 
9 E. D Brown, The International Law Of The Sea Volume I (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited 1994), 9. 
10 Lewis M. Alexander, 'The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries' (1986) 5 Political Geography Quarterly, 1-2. 
11 Ibid (n 7) 169. 
12 Theodoros Tsakiris, 'The Importance of East Mediterranean Gas for EU Energy Security: The Role of 
Cyprus, Israel and Egypt' [2018] 30 Cyprus Review 25, 25. 
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In this study, the structure of the content will be divided into two parts. In Part I, primarily the nature 
and extents of maritime zones, will be expounded with the help of subheadings in order to establish the base 
of analysing the case of Turkey. Secondly, general rules of maritime delimitation and its development will be 
investigated chronologically by referencing the essential conventions. Lastly, the principles and methods of 
maritime delimitation will be examined in depth by referencing the significant cases related to the case of 
Turkey.  
In Part II, firstly the background of the Eastern Mediterranean will be explained in light of numerical 
facts to broad general knowledge of the region in question. Secondly, the policies of the riparian States will 
be scrutinised to reveal the clear picture of the Eastern Mediterranean by mentioning the actions of Turkey. 
Then, the approach of Turkey towards maritime zones under international law will be identified, and after 
that, the claims of Turkey in the region and counter criticisms will be discussed. Afterwards, the degree of 
applicability of Turkish claims and the strength of its grounds will be assessed in light of counter criticisms, 
and the question of whether there is room for Turkey’s claims in the maritime world will be tried to be 
answered. Finally, the results of the argument will be summarised in the conclusion section. 
PART I 
2. The Nature and Extent of Maritime Zones 
2.1 Internal Waters 
Internal, or interior, or national,13 waters are defined both under Article 5(1) of the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958 (TSC) and Article 8(1) of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) similarly. Accordingly, the internal waters of a 
State can be defined as those waters located on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea. Also, 
unlike Article 5 of TSC, there is an exception regarding the archipelagic States placed in Article 8 of 
UNCLOS. 
The seaward limit of internal waters is determined by a baseline from which can be used to measure 
the Territorial Sea,14 and the type of the baseline can be changed due to geographical features of the 
coastline. There are two types of standard baselines, namely, normal and straight baselines. The low-water 
line parameter has been prescribed as a general rule both conventional15 and customary law16 and is known 
                                                 
13 Ibid (n 3) 60. 
14 Ibid (n 4) 77. 
15 Article 5 of UNCLOS; Article 3 of TSC. 
16 Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) ICJ Reports [1951] 116,128. 
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as a normal baseline.17 In particular cases, the method of the straight baseline might be used by considering 
specified land points due to where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into or a fringe of islands in the 
vicinity of the coast as datum points in order to form a baseline.18 As a result, baselines are the main 
determinants of setting the limits of internal waters. Besides, coastal States have a right to enjoy full 
sovereignty over its internal waters, and even the right of the innocent passage does not have any validity19 
except for where the internal waters have been determined in recent times by implementing a straight 
baseline method.20  
2.2 Territorial Sea 
The territorial sea is known to be one of the oldest and pioneer concepts of the law of the sea. The 
principal aim of the concept is to ensure the sovereignty of coastal State over a sea belt adjacent to its 
cost.21 In the beginning, the limits of the territorial sea were attributed to the cannon shot rule which enabled 
protection of the ports as well as the ships located within the range of cannons.22 In this sense, the range 
was determined at around three nautical miles (nm) due to the technology of 18th-century cannons.23 
Therefore, the breadth of the territorial sea was accepted as three nm at that time. 
The sovereignty of a coastal State over its territorial waters is defined in Article 2 of TSC that 
“extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.” However, TSC does not 
provide sufficient explanation regarding the question of the breadth of the territorial sea.24 Accordingly, 
Article 6 points out that “the outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance 
from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea”. In addition, the right of 
innocent passage for ships of all States through the territorial sea is guaranteed under Article 14(1) of TSC. 
Article 2 of UNCLOS also adopts the same approach for the subject of sovereignty as TSC does. 
However, Article 3 of UNCLOS offers considerable clarity regarding the breadth of the territorial sea that 
“Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nm, 
measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention”.  Accordingly, there is no need to 
                                                 
17 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, The Law Of The Sea And Maritime Boundary Delimitation In South-East Asia 
(Oxford University Press 1987), 13. 
18 Article 7 of UNCLOS; Article 4 of TSC. 
19 Ibid (n 4) 78. 
20 Article 8 of UNCLOS; Article 5(2) of TSC. 
21Krateros M. Ioannou, ‘The Greek Territorial Sea’, in Theodore C Kariotis (ed), Greece and the Law of the 
Sea (Kluwer Law International 1997), 119. 
22 D. P O'Connell and I. A Shearer, the International Law of the Sea Volume I (Clarendon Press 1982), 125-
26. 
23 Ibid (n 21). 
24 Ibid (n 9) 44. 
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proclaim the breadth of the territorial sea as it can be considered as a mere consequence of the sovereignty 
on land (ipso iure).25 Lastly, the right of innocent passage for ships of all States is also part of the UNCLOS 
placed in Article 17. 
2.3 Contiguous Zone 
The contiguous zone can be defined as a maritime zone contiguous to and located on the seaward 
side of the territorial sea where coastal States have certain specific powers to enforce administrative 
interests.26 The roots of the concept of the contiguous zone date back to the Hovering Acts legitimised by 
Great Britain in the 18th century27 and this concept was aimed of protecting coastal States' revenue against 
smuggling as well as their public health against disease.28 
The concept of the contiguous zone in international law has for the first time been prescribed in 
Article 24(1) of TSC that “In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State may 
exercise the control necessary to (a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed 
within its territory or territorial sea.” Besides, the limit of the contiguous zone is determined in Article 24(2) of 
TSC that “may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured”. The definition of the concept is also adopted in Article 33 of UNCLOS with certain 
amendments regarding breadth, and accordingly, the limit of the contiguous zone is extended to 24 nm by 
Article 33(2) of UNCLOS. Lastly, under both TSC and UNCLOS, the proclamation of the contiguous zone 
must be expressed by the coastal States; otherwise, the zone in question cannot be ascribed by itself.29 
2.4 Continental Shelf 
The introduction of technological innovations and rising anticipation for the exploitation of the seabed 
resources are the main motivations behind the concept of the continental shelf.30 Pursuant thereto, firstly the 
33th President Truman of the United States (US) declared a proclamation that "Having concern for the 
urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its natural resources, the Government of the United States 
regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but 
                                                 
25 Tullio Scovazzi, 'Maritime Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea' (The GMF of the US, 2012)1, 2. 
<http://www.gmfus.org/publications/maritime-boundaries-eastern-mediterranean-sea> accessed 21 June 
2019. 
26 Christos L Rozakis and Constantine A Stephanou, The New Law Of The Sea “Selected And Edited Papers 
Of The Athens Colloquium On The Law Of The Sea” (North-Holland 1983), 69. 
27 Ibid (n 4) 121. 
28 D. P O'Connell and I. A Shearer, The International Law Of The Sea Volume II (Clarendon Press 1984), 
1034. 
29 Ibid (n 3) 135–36. 
30 Ibid (n 17) 57. 
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contiguous to the coasts of the United States, subject to jurisdiction and control".31Then, the concept became 
accepted as a customary law after having made analogous communiques by the majority of States.32 
As a geological term, the continental shelf can be defined as the natural extension of coastal States 
under the sea, and the legal definition of the term is also derived from the geological identifications regarding 
the issue.33 The term continental shelf is prescribed under the Article 1 of Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, 1958 ("CSC") that "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast 
but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or beyond that limit, to where the depth of 
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas". According to this 
definition, there are two criteria to set the seaward limits of the continental shelf: the depth of 200 metres and 
the exploitability test. However, the exploitability test creates an unequal and uncertain environment with 
respect to different technological capacities of States as the outer limits of the continental shelf are 
depended upon the technological abilities of they have.34 
In order to form a precise definition in particular the limits of the seaward, unlike Article 1 of CSC, an 
alternative definition is provided by Article 76(1) of the UNCLOS that "The continental shelf of a coastal State 
comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout 
the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 
200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of 
the continental margin does not extend up to that distance". That is to say; geological (the outer edge of the 
continental margin) and distance-based (200 nm from the baselines) features are established as alternative 
factors. 
Lastly, Article 2 of CSC and Article 77 of UNCLOS point out that unlike the contiguous zone, the 
continental shelf is automatically ascribed to the coastal State35 without depending on the occupation, 
effective or notional, or any express proclamation. They are also identical in terms of expressing the aim of 
performing sovereign rights within the States' continental shelf, which is the "exploration and exploitation of 
the natural resources". 
 
                                                 
31 'Proclamation 2667 "Policy Of The United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil 
and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf"' (Trumanlibrary.org, 2017) 
<https://www.trumanlibrary.org/proclamations/index.php?pid=252&st=&st1=> accessed 23 June 2019. 
32 Ibid (n 6) 2. 
33 Hüseyin Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri II. Kitap (Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Yayinlari 1989), 318. 
34 Ibid (n 4) 133. 
35 Ibid (n 3) 135. 
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2.5 Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) 
The concept of EEZ, generally known as the 200-mile limit and is also referred to as "patrimonial 
sea" throughout its generic phase, symbolizes the victory of individualism over collectivism in international 
relations. The concept aims to ensure the rights of coastal States over the resources of the seabed, the 
subsoil and as well as the sea, regardless of any conditions such as economic, geographical or ecological.36 
In 1945, President Truman declared another proclamation that allows the US "to establish 
conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States wherein 
fishing activities have been or in the future may be developed and maintained on a substantial scale".37 
Afterwards, the proclamation of fisheries has never put into operation; however, it is regarded as a milestone 
in the law of the sea by urging other developing coastal States on propounding extensive maritime claims.38 
At that time, developing coastal States did not have advanced fleets to benefit from the doctrine of freedom 
of fishing in the high seas, and in their point of view, the situation was seen as unfair. Because there was no 
chance to compete with the fleets of developed States such as Japan, the Soviet Union or the US have. 
Therefore, in order to tackle this injustice, in 1947 first Chile and after a while Peru issued proclamation 
regarding national sovereignty over the continental shelf and the seas adjacent to its coasts up to a limit of 
200 nm,39 and this was regarded as the first reflection of the concept of EEZ in State practice.40 Later, the 
same approach was adopted by the many Latin American States such as Ecuador, Panama and Argentina.41 
Despite the customary background of EEZ, the concept has been for the first time integrated in 
international literature with UNCLOS.42 The context of the concept is regulated between Article 55 and 85 of 
UNCLOS, and the concept of EEZ is explained as "EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial 
sea,43 up to a limit 200 nm from the baselines where the breadth of territorial waters are started to be 
measured.44 According to Article 56 of UNCLOS, coastal States have certain specific powers over the EEZ, 
and these are namely that administrative, economic and jurisdictional. The said Article regulates the 
following points: 
                                                 
36 Ibid (n 22) 552. 
37 'Proclamation 2668"Policy of the United States with respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the 
High Seas"(Trumanlibrary.org, 2017) 
<https://www.trumanlibrary.org/proclamations/index.php?pid=253&st=&st1=> accessed 24 June 2019. 
38 David Joseph Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone In International Law (Clarendon Press 1987), 2. 
39 Tommy T. B. Koh, 'The Exclusive Economic Zone' [1988] 30 MALAYA L. REV. 1, 4. 
40 Ibid (n 3) 124. 
41 Ibid (n 22) 558.  
42 Ibid (n 38) 43.  
43 Article 55 of UNCLOS. 
44 Article 57 of UNCLOS. 
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 Exploration, exploitation, conservation and supervision of the living and non-living natural 
resources in the seabed as well as the subsoil areas,  
 Economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the 
water, currents and winds, 
 The establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, 
 Carry out the marine scientific research, 
 The protection and preservation of the marine environment. 
The scope of the rights and duties of the other States is regulated within Article 58 of UNCLOS, 
namely, the freedom of navigation, overflight and of the laying of submarine cables, pipelines and of other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those related to operation of ships, 
aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines. 
Lastly, there is no pertinent provision in the UNCLOS about addressing whether a State must claim 
an EEZ in order to be ascribed to it. However, it has been regarded as there has to be a claim to be entitled 
to it. Nevertheless, the way of notifying charts and lists of geographical coordinates to the public and 
depositing a copy of each document to the Secretary-General of the United Nations are pointed out in Article 
75 of UNCLOS. Therefore it has been regarded as there has to be a declaration in order to be entitled to it.45 
2.6 High Seas 
The principle of freedom is applied to the high seas. However, it does not mean that there is no 
authority on the high seas. The order on the high seas is fulfilled by the doctrine of the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the flag State.46 The high seas are defined in the Geneva Convention on High Seas, 1958 ("HSC") as "all 
parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State". However, due 
to the introduction of EEZ and archipelagic waters, the definition in question has to be amended.47 Pursuant 
thereto, the scope of the high seas is described in Article 86 of UNCLOS as "all parts of the sea that are not 
included in the EEZ, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of 
an archipelagic State". 
 Freedom of the high seas is described in Article 2 of HSC and expanded with Article 87 of 
UNCLOS. Accordingly, various matters such as freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, freedom to lay 
submarine cables and pipelines, freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under 
                                                 
45 Ibid (n 9) 218. 
46 Ibid (n 4) 149. 
47 Ibid (n 3) 203. 
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international law, freedom of fishing, freedom of scientific research are encompassed, and in this sense, 
these freedoms might be utilised by all States under the condition of considering the interests of other States 
in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. 
3. General Rules of Maritime Delimitation 
3.1 The Hague Conference 1930 
In spite of its futility, the Hague Codification Conference of 1930 is known as the primary 
international endeavour to codify the rules and also methods of maritime delimitation.48 The conference 
mainly focuses on the territorial waters and the contiguous zone rather than dealing with the delimitation 
between States with adjacent or opposite coasts.49 
During the conference and its preparatory work, the idea of applying the method of negotiation or 
agreement in maritime delimitation was highlighted by referring to an individual character of each case. On 
the other hand, as a delimitation rule, the technical method of taking perpendicular to the general 
configuration of the coast was also given significant prominence. (Before the invention of the equidistance 
rule)50 Nonetheless, in the end of the conference participants of could not reach an agreement regarding the 
matter of delimitation.51  
3.2 The International Law Commission (1949-1956) and the 1958 Geneva 
Conference 
 In order to encourage the progressive development of international law and its codification, the duty 
of starting studies and making recommendations was given to the United Nations General Assembly 
("UNGA") by the Article 13 of Charter of the United Nations, 1945 and in this regard the International Law 
Commission ("ILC") was assigned to conduct this work. ILC initiated its task in 1949 by giving precedence to 
the high seas which encompassed the concept of the continental shelf. Later, in 1951, the priority of the ILC 
shifted from the high seas to the regime of the territorial sea due to the recommendation of the UNGA.52 
ILC established a committee composed of maritime delimitation specialists for assessing and 
reporting the issue technically. According to the report of the committee of experts, they explicitly suggested 
that implementing the method of the median line was the best way of delimitation in an opposite situation; 
however, they also emphasised that navigational interests and fishing rights might trigger the need for using 
                                                 
48 Ibid (n 6) 7. 
49 S. P Jagota, Maritime Boundary (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985), 49. 
50 Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation "The Quest for Distributive Justice 
in International Law" (Cambridge University Press 2015), 205. 
51 Ibid (n 48). 
52 Ibid (n 49) 50. 
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an alternative method to solve the matter. In addition, they proposed that the method of equidistance from 
the respective coastlines should be used while determining the lateral boundaries.53 
After having released the report, the majority of the ILC members was assessed the report as 
reasonable to adopt. This method was decided to use both the regime of territorial sea and the concept of 
the continental shelf. On the other hand, there was a tendency among some members to implement the 
median line/equidistance method as a general rule by excluding the other determinants. However, other 
members stated that adopting such a rigid approach would limit the inclusionary feature of the method and 
also reduce the chance of successful implementation for all cases.54 
As a result, the rule of median line/equidistance was determined as the point of departure while 
initiating the delimitation process, and ILC pointed out in the draft report that the boundary at stake would be 
subject to modification in cases in which special circumstances justify another boundary line.55 That is to say, 
the method in question gained an elastic character with the introduction of special circumstances. 
After having finished the process of draft, UNGA organised the First United Nation Conference on 
the Law of the Sea that also known as the 1958 Geneva Conference. Four international conventions called 
Geneva Conventions were acknowledged after having completed the conference. 
The delimitation of the territorial sea is provided in Article 12 of TSC as follows: 
1. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is 
entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line 
every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply, 
however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the 
territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance with this provision. 
2. The line of delimitation between the territorial seas of two States lying opposite to each other or 
adjacent to each other shall be marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal States. 
The delimitation of the continental shelf is provided in Article 6 of CSC as follows: 
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts 
are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be 
determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is 
                                                 
53 Edward Jr. Collins and Martin A. Rogoff, 'The International Law Of Maritime Boundary Delimitation' [1982] 
34 ME. L. REV. 1, 26. 
54 Ibid (n 6) 8-9. 
55 Ibid (n 49) 54. 
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justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from 
the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. 
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the 
boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of 
agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be 
determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. 
3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf, any lines which are drawn in accordance with 
the principles set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article should be defined with reference to charts and 
geographical features as they exist at a particular date, and reference should be made to fixed permanent 
identifiable points on the land. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the proposed draft articles were accepted with minor amendments. 
For example, the wording of "special circumstances" was changed to "historic title and special 
circumstances". Also, Article 24 of TSC adopted the same approach taken by Article 12 in terms of 
delimitation of the contiguous zone; however, there was no reference regarding historic title or special 
circumstances. 
3.3 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 ("UNCLOS") 
UNCLOS is one of the most contemplated and comprehensive Conventions of recent times, and it 
has brought significant innovations in several fields.56It was concluded in 1982 and entered into force in 
1994. Moreover, hitherto it has been ratified by 168 States.57 The legal structure of UNCLOS can be defined 
as the combination of quasi-legislation, the creation of new law, codified customary law and consensus.58 
Hence, these features enable UNCLOS to reach a considerable number of ratifications.  Despite the high 
rate approval, UNCLOS does not provide a predetermined prescription for maritime delimitation; instead, it 
creates an opportunity to discuss the matters internationally and paves the way of consensus by setting 
blueprint of delimitation.59  
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The UNCLOS incorporates in three articles on the subject of maritime delimitations, namely, Article 
15, 74 and 83. The text of Article 15, relating to the delimitation of the territorial sea, provides for the 
implementation of equidistance rule in case of not reaching an agreement between the States60 which is 
almost identical in comparison with the wording of Article 12 of TSC.61 Besides, Article 15 also is not contain 
any detailed explanation regarding the scope of historic title and special circumstances and its application. In 
conclusion, the delimitation is not turned into a controversial issue due to the outer limit of the territorial sea 
has been determined as 12 miles.62 
The text of Article 74, relating to the delimitation of the EEZ, provided as follows: 
1. The delimitation of the EEZ between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by 
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution. 
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned shall 
resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV.  
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of 
understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. 
Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation. 
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions relating to the 
delimitation of the EEZ shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement. 
After having examined the text above, it can be said that the text of Article 83, relating to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf, is identical, in terms of all practical features, as Article 74 above. 
According to both articles, the States are under the obligation of behaving in "good faith" whilst conducting 
the process of negotiations to reach an agreement on the delimitation. However, except for the instructions 
regarding the way of behaving or the necessity of putting in the effort to strike a balance, articles at stake do 
not say much. Specifically, they do not indicate any substantive regime that provides the necessary steps to 
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follow for tackling the problem in case of a lack of agreement.63Moreover, due to the texts' blur approach and 
the placed reference in the first paragraph, the verdicts of the courts and tribunals would gain a pivotal 
position for comprehending the delimitation issue.64 
The vague characteristics of the articles are stemmed from practical reasons. For example, States 
encountering various issues of delimitation depending on, configurational differences of their coastlines and 
the various neighbouring States involved. Therefore, some States need specific solutions to implement in 
accordance with the features of their maritime zones. As a result, it can be said that the vagueness style is 
preferred deliberately to be able to reach a consensus between States and also to broaden the 
comprehensiveness of articles in question by acquiring flexibility.65 
4. Principles and Methods of Delimitation 
4.1 The Method of Equidistance 
The principle of equidistance or the median line is one of the most prominent and prevalent 
techniques applied as the method of delimitation. The term was created by Whittemore Boggs and defined 
as "the line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point or points on opposite shores", but his 
method was designed only for delimitation in lakes, rivers, gulfs or straits between opposite States.66 After 
that, it is also incorporated in Article 12 of TSC as well as Article 6 of TSC by specifying the location of 
nearest points as “of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.” 
 The main determinants of this method are the islands and the configuration of the coasts. Since it 
procures the establishment of baselines in which the breadth of the territorial sea is started to be measured. 
Accordingly, a single line is produced, either as an equidistant line between adjacent States or as a median 
between opposite States.67 In addition, it can lead to some controversial issues if the States implement 
different methods for setting their baselines because the starting points of each baseline depends on the 
selected method.68 
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 Equidistance is widely acknowledged that is part and parcel of delimitation, or in other words, it is 
inherent in the process of delimitation. It ensures the allocation of areas which States have evenly legitimate 
entitlements on the grounds of "closer propinquity". Moreover, it also offers an objective criterion to protect 
the participants of the delimitation, and with the help of this, predictability can be provided.69 Nevertheless, it 
should be remembered that those features are fully implemented and resulted in an equitable solution under 
the condition of “ceteris paribus”70. That is to say, in case of the absence of any special circumstances or 
historical title objections, it will be the best option as a delimitation method. For example, there are 
successful bilateral agreements concluded by using original concept free from any modifications such as 
Black and Baltic Sea applications due to the suitable conditions. 
Despite its conventional background and popularity, the privileged status of the method has been 
diminished over time by International Court of Justice ("ICJ") and the arbitral tribunals because the results of 
the method are considered as inequitable and unreasonable.71 In particular, the case of North Sea 
Continental Shelf72 is known as a precursor of this tendency, and it changes the general perception from "the 
equidistance can in some cases lead to an inequitable result" to "only in some, it is eligible to reach an 
equitable one". In other words, the rule has become an exception, the exception the rule. Afterwards, specific 
criticisms against the equidistance extend its grounds, and the method started to be presented as an almost 
unmitigated evil.73 Ultimately, apart from Article 15 of UNCLOS, neither equidistance nor median line is not 
incorporated in Article 74 or 83 of UNCLOS. 
Upon scrutinising the case law, it can be said that the notion of diminishing the effect of the 
equidistance method has evolved in case basis, and all started with the North Sea Case as aforementioned. 
Accordingly, in North Sea Case74 the court points out that the principle of equidistance is not reflecting or 
crystallizing a rule of customary international law and later State implications do not have an ability to convert 
the conventional rule into a rule of customary international law.75 In addition, they state that it cannot be 
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accepted as a mandatory rule of customary law.76 In Tunisia/Libya Case77, the court holds that "equidistance 
is not either a mandatory legal principle or a method having some privileged status in relation to other 
methods".78 In Canada/United States of America Case (Gulf Of Maine)79, the court shares the same view of 
North Sea Case have,80 and additionally, state that "none of the potential methods has intrinsic merits which 
would make it preferable to another in the abstract [...] at any rate, there is no single method which 
intrinsically brings greater justice or is of greater practical usefulness".81 Lastly, in Guinea/Guinea-Bissau 
Case82, the court also reiterates the previous judgements by emphasizing that there is no requirement to 
apply or to give precedence to the rule of equidistance.83 
After assessing the principle of equidistance in terms of reaching equitable results, it can be said that 
with time, the initial perception has evolved from trouble-shooting to trouble-making. For this reason, almost 
in every case, before making necessary adjustments by considering the curvature of the coastline or the 
islands’ location in closer proximity, only the starting point function of the method is underlined.84 Because in 
order to initiate a successful and reasonable delimitation, States has to need a take-off point.85 Therefore, 
strictly speaking, the method in question should be named as a simple tool instead of a principle or school of 
thought. 
4.2 Equity and the Equitable Principle 
The term of equity is defined in the Black's Law Dictionary as "The body of principles constituting 
what is fair and right; natural law".86 According to the definition, it can be said that there is a strong 
correlation and virtual synonymy between the equity and law which cannot be thought separately as both of 
them are based on the idea of justice.87 
When examining the historical relationship between the equity and law in the maritime delimitation 
process, the equitable principle was primarily introduced in 1945 Truman's Proclamation by stating that "In 
cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State or is shared with an adjacent State, 
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the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in accordance with 
equitable principles".88 
As aforesaid in the previous subheading, North Sea Case89 triggers a rebellion against the principle 
of equidistance; however, it also lays the foundation for the court's doctrine of implementation of equitable 
principles to maritime boundary delimitation.90 In this sense, the court states that “delimitation is to be 
effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking into account all the relevant 
circumstances”.91 Besides, the paths of these two concepts intersect again in the negotiation phase of 
UNCLOS, and the notion of equity is adopted in both Article 74 and 83 instead of the equidistance method. 
In addition to North Sea Case92, there are also several attempts made by ICJ and arbitral tribunals in 
order to form and determine the body of equitable principles. For example, Tunisia/Libya Case93, Gulf Of 
Maine Case94 and Libya/Malta Case95 can be counted as the representatives of this trend. Among these, 
there is a need to mention the decision of the Gulf Of Maine Case96 as it emphasizes the uniqueness of each 
case, in this regard the court states that "each specific case is, in the final analysis, different from all the 
others, that it is monotypic [...] the most appropriate criteria/method/combination of methods [...] can only be 
determined in relation to each particular case and its specific characteristics".97 
In conclusion, despite the absence of a structured body to lead the way out and also the lack of a 
prescribed equitable principles list to implement each unique case, it can be said that the notion of equity has 
had a place in both the conventional and the case law. Because the process of maritime delimitation has a 
dynamic nature rather than a static one. Thus, as long as taking all of the determinants or special 
circumstances into consideration objectively while conducting the process, the equitable solution will be 
appeared needless of any prescription.  
4.3 Geographical Circumstances 
After having examined the history, definition and rationale of the respective zones in terms of 
conventional and case law, it can be assumed that the geographical circumstances are the one that has a 
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dominant character amongst the relevant conditions implemented.98 That is to say; there is no doubt that 
geography is at the core of the maritime delimitation.99 In particular, the court decisions have perpetually 
underlined the significance of the land and coastal configuration for maritime delimitation on the basis of an 
equitable principle.100  
As the case law has repeatedly noted that "the land dominates the sea"101which has for the first time 
been formulated in the North Sea Case.102 Accordingly, the right of States on maritime zones stem from the 
coast, are thus dictated by coastal geography.103 Moreover, the court states in the same decision that “It is 
necessary to examine closely the geographical configuration of the coastline of the countries [...] to be 
delimited”.104 Furthermore, they also point out that “It is therefore not a question of totally refashioning 
geography whatever the facts of the situation but [...] abating the effects of an incidental special feature from 
which an unjustifiable difference of treatment could result.105 In other words, they emphasize the necessity of 
assessing the geographical conditions before delimitating the zone as well as the impossibility of reshaping 
the geography.  
There are also other cases worth mentioning that put emphasis on the subject in question. For 
example, in Tunisia/Libya Case106, the court takes the radical change in the general direction of the Tunisian 
coastline into account while reaching its verdict.107 Another example is that in the Barbados/Trinidad-Tobago 
Case108 mainly focuses on the length of coasts in order to make necessary adjustments by shifting the 
provisional equidistance line.109 In conclusion, owing to the impossibility of redesigning the geography, the 
other principles in use have been shaped on geographical grounds such as "the principle of non-
encroachment (non-cutting off)" and "the principle of fair and reasonable proportionality" Pursuant thereto, 
the modern jurisprudence mainly focuses on the following three determinants since they may lead to the 
modification of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable solution: 
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 The Principles of Non-Encroachment (Non-Cutting Off), 
 The Principle of Proportionality, 
 Disproportionate distorting effect that islands, rocks, promontories, and other small 
features.110 
4.3.1 The Principle of Non-Encroachment (Non-Cutting Off) 
 The Principle of Non-Encroachment (Non-Cutting Off) has first introduced in the North Sea Case111 
and regarded as the founding principle of natural prolongation.112 In this sense, the court emphasizes that 
delimitation has to be conducted “without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of 
the other party”.113 Moreover, after having introduced the distance-based approach regarding entitlements 
under UNCLOS, the significance of natural physical prolongation has decreased; however, the principle of 
non-encroachment maintains its importance.114  
In Bangladesh/Myanmar Case115, Bangladesh experiences the cutting off issue as Germany has 
experienced before in North Sea region due to its coastal concavity. Accordingly, it can be said that both 
cases have similar characteristics. In this regard in Bangladesh/Myanmar Case116 arbitral tribunal 
summarizes the principle of non-encroachment and states that “when an equidistance line drawn between 
two States produces a cut-off effect on the maritime entitlement of one of those States, as a result of the 
concavity of the coast, then an adjustment of that line may be necessary in order to reach an equitable 
result”.117 
 In Canada/France Arbitration (St. Pierre and Miquelon)118, the tribunal indicates that two French 
islands namely St. Pierre and Miquelon cannot “encroach upon or cut off a parallel frontal projection of the 
adjacent segments of the Newfoundland southern coast”.119 Similarly, in Nicaragua/Colombia Case120, the 
court states that “the effect of the provisional median line is to cut Nicaragua off from some three quarters of 
the area into which its coast projects [...] that cut-off effect is produced by a few small islands which are 
many nautical miles apart [...] the cut-off effect is a relevant consideration which requires adjustment or 
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shifting of the provisional median line in order to produce an equitable result.121 In conclusion, both decisions 
demonstrate that in order to achieve an equitable result, the provisional equidistance line has to be modified 
in favour of the mainland country if there is a cut-off effect stems from the islands. 
 As a result, upon considering the aforementioned cases, it can be assumed that there has been 
settled case-law in favour of the States that may be exposed to the cut-off effect due to other State’s islands 
located in closer proximity to their mainland or configurational differences of their coasts. In addition, it 
should be remembered that the principle of non-encroachment is just one of the principles that assist in 
reaching an equitable result by carrying out necessary adjustments. In addition, there is no guarantee that 
the implication of this principle would be useful in every similar case since each case has its own 
determinants. 
4.3.2 The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality has a pivotal role in maritime delimitation, and it has been 
incorporated in virtually all cases. Accordingly, maritime delimitation should be concluded by considering the 
ratio between the relevant maritime zones of each party and the lengths of their relevant coasts.122 There are 
two functions of this principle. First, as a test to verify the equitableness of the delimitation line in the final 
stage of delimitation123, secondly, as a tool for determining marked disparity in coastal lengths so as to exert 
it in the process of delimitation.124 
The concept of proportionality has first emerged in North Sea Case125, and the justification of the 
decision is based on three conditions to be met to exert: (i) the coasts of three States at stake are adjacent 
to each other, (ii) the coastlines of Germany are concave, (iii) the coastline of the States abutting on the 
North Sea are comparable in length.126 However, the subsequent cases do not prefer to abide by the 
justification concerned, and the idea of proportionality is started to be evolved. 
In Tunisia/Libya Case127, despite the absence of anomalies in terms of geographical circumstances, 
the proportionality is regarded as a fundamental principle to be applied for ensuring an equitable 
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delimitation.128 In Libya/Malta Case129 and also in Gulf Maine Case130, the application area of proportionality 
is extended, and the proportionality is started to be practised in a delimitation between States with opposite 
coasts. In this sense, Churchill and Lowe states that coastal length differences are a relevant circumstance, 
“especially (perhaps only) in the case of opposite coasts”.131 In Barbados/Trinidad-Tobago Case132, the 
significance of the coastal lengths in the process of delimitation is emphasized, however, it is also stated that 
there is no obligation to determine the line of delimitation should be based on the ratio between the relevant 
maritime zones of each party and the lengths of their relevant coasts or on some other mathematical 
calculation.133 Lastly, in Romania/Ukraine Case (Black Sea)134, the test function of the proportionality is 
highlighted as it reveals whether there is an equitable result or not.135 
Upon examining the implementation of proportionality on a case-by-case basis, it can be seen that 
the interpretation of the ratios is different from case to case. In the Black Sea Case136, the court points out 
that the ratio of the relevant coastal lengths and the ratio of the relevant area are approximately 1:2.8 and 
1:2.1, respectively.137 Hence, they hold that there is no need to make any alteration over the line constructed 
due to the test of equitableness.138 In Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration139, the tribunal finds that the ratios of the 
lengths of the coasts and the relevant areas are 1: 1.31 and 1:1.09, respectively. Accordingly, they decide 
that there is no disproportionality.140 On the other hand, there are also other cases that include marked 
disparities in terms of the ratio of coastal lengths between the States. For example, in the Malta/Libya 
Case141, the court comments the coastal length ratio of 8: 1 as a great disparity in favour of Libya.142 In 
Denmark/Norway Case (Jan Mayen)143, the difference is even greater than 9: 1 in favour of Denmark.144 
Lastly, in the Nicaragua/Colombia Case145, the court confirms that the ratio of 8.2: 1 as a substantial disparity 
                                                 
128 Ibıd 61, para 103. 
129 Ibıd (n 95). 
130 Ibıd (n 79). 
131 Ibid (n 3) 189. 
132 Ibid (n 108).  
133 Ibid 72, para 236. 
134 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania/Ukraine) [2009] ICJ Reports 61. 
135 Ibid 103, para 122.  
136 Ibıd (n 134).  
137 Ibid 130, para 215. 
138 Ibid para 216.  
139 Eritrea v Yemen Arbitration (1999) 119 ILR 1. 
140 Ibid 50, para 168. 
141 Ibıd (n 95). 
142 Ibıd 41, para 68. 
143 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark/Norway) [1993] ICJ 
Reports 38. 
144 Ibid para 61, 90. 
145 Ibıd (n 120). 
26 
 
in favour of Nicaragua.146 In conclusion, the above-mentioned cases are resulted in an adjustment of the 
provisional median line so as to attribute a larger maritime area in favour of the State, which has a longer 
coastline. 
As a result, the principle of proportionality has evolved with the help of the court decisions and 
arbitral awards to contribute to achieving equitable results. Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that 
this principle cannot directly issue the precise solution and also there is no necessity for the courts to 
determine the line of delimitation by referencing the ratios at stake. The proportionality is just capable of 
providing data to lead the process of delimitation in the right direction. The ultimate decision can be made 
only after considering all determinants for each unique case. 
4.3.3 The Effect of Islands 
The islands are one of the main determinants of maritime delimitation since they have a capacity to 
engender distorting impact on a delimitation line.147 The definition of the island is made identically by both 
Article 10 of TSC and Article 121(1) of UNCLOS; “an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by 
water, which is above water at high tide”. Moreover, Article 121(2) of UNCLOS confers on islands the same 
entitlements as other land territories in terms of enjoying its territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf. On the 
other hand, the international conventions do not provide a clear definition for the rocks, and this situation 
causes controversial issues between States because the rocks cannot have any EEZ or continental shelf 
unless being recognised as an island. Accordingly, Article 121(3) of UNCLOS states some criteria that are to 
“sustain of human habitation or economic life of their own” as distinctive features for the rocks, but even so, 
there is a lack of proper definition to distinguishing rocks from islands.148 In this regard, differentiation can be 
made with the help of court decisions and bilateral agreements. 
Despite the potential of drawing and adjusting of equidistance lines, the distorting impacts of islands 
can be differed due to various features149 such as the size of the island, its status, its overall economic, 
social and political importance, and last but not least the distance from the mainland.150 Hence, the islands 
may be given full weight, no weight or something in between with respect to features concerned.151 For 
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example, in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case152, the tribunal decides not to take into account all of the 
islands.153 They classify islands into three categories. First, the coastal islands are accepted as integral parts 
of the continent. Second, the Bijagos archipelago is given a partial effect in determining the general direction 
of the coast. Third, the scattered islands located in the south are mostly ignored.154 In United 
Kingdom/France Arbitration (the Channel Islands)155, the Channel Islands, which belongs to the UK is 
located near France coasts. Accordingly, the tribunal describes the position of the islands as “on the wrong 
side of the median line and wholly detached geographically from the UK”.156 Therefore, they design a median 
line without taking into account the Channel Islands, and instead, the islands are partially enclaved with 
twelve-mile territorial seas due to its population, political independence and economic reasons.157 In the 
Black Sea Case158, the court does not give an effect to the Serpents’ Island for the construction of provisional 
equidistance line and states that the island at stake is 20 nm away from the mainland of Ukraine, is not one 
of a cluster of fringe islands constituting “the coast” of Ukraine. Moreover, they underline that to count the 
island as a relevant part of the coast would amount to grafting an extraneous element onto Ukraine’s 
coastline which neither the law nor practice of maritime delimitation authorizes. That is to say; the court is 
against the refashioning of the geography by a judicial decision.159 
As a result, after having examined the cases above, it can be said that unlike the wording of Article 
121(2) of UNCLOS, the islands cannot be considered as other land territories in terms of having rights for 
EEZ and continental shelf in every case. Strictly speaking, mentioned rights depend on the special 
circumstances, and the distance of the island from its mainland as well as from the coast of opposite State is 
a crucial factor for deciding the issue. 
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PART II 
5. An Overview of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea 
The area of the Mediterranean Sea, including the Sea of Marmara, is approximately 970,000 square 
miles. From west to east from Gibraltar to Syria is around 2,500 miles, and its average north-south breadth, 
from the coasts of Croatia to that of Libya, the distance is about 500 miles.160 The Mediterranean Sea can be 
divided into three separate geographic areas: Western Mediterranean: the Central Mediterranean: and the 
Eastern Mediterranean.161 The Eastern Mediterranean is a semi-enclosed sea, has an intercontinental 
character, is surrounded by Africa, Asia and Europe and lying latitude 30˚49΄ N and between longitudes 016˚ 
30΄ E and 036˚ 12΄E. Its average north-south extent and west-east distances are 340 miles and 450 miles, 
respectively. In addition, the area is approximately 90.000 square miles. The Eastern Mediterranean coastal 
States consist of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Greece (Rhodes, Kastellorizo), GCASC, TRNC, and 
their coastal lengths are 569, 95, 107, 128, 522, 188, 220 and 205 miles, respectively.162 
The Eastern Mediterranean has been a significant area for States throughout history and dubbed as 
“fertile crescent”.163 At present, it still maintains as well as strengthens its reputation due to explored energy 
resources and also promising untouched reserves. Because the world economy of today strictly depends on 
the energy, however, the current energy supplies are limited and not promising to reach an equilibrium point 
in order to respond to the increasing demand in the long run. According to the 2010 US Geological Survey, 
the mean of estimated undiscovered oil is approximately 1,763 Million Barrels of Oil (“MMBO”), with a range 
from 491 to 4,266 MMBO. For undiscovered gas, the total average volume is 223,242 billion cubic feet of 
gas (“BCFG”), with a range from 92,614 to 425,935 BCFG. For natural gas liquids, the total mean volume is 
5,974 million barrels of natural gas liquids (“MMBNGL”), with a range of 2,451 to 11,464 MMBNGL.164 
Moreover, Mediterranean basin has a high producible gas hydrate potential which is approximately 98,160 
standard trillion cubic meter, and the Eastern Mediterranean basins have the highest gas hydrate potential in 
comparison with the Western Mediterranean due to its lower geothermal gradient and high amount of source 
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gas potential.165 In light of these facts, there is nothing to be surprised for an excessive interest over the 
Eastern Mediterranean region. 
 Upon considering the maritime delimitation, the parts of the Mediterranean demonstrate different 
characteristics. Whilst the delimitation problem can be tackled on the basis of technical matters in the 
Western and Central Mediterranean, on the contrary in the Eastern Mediterranean is much more intricate 
due to the political and territorial instability and uncertainty in that region.166 There is an in-depth historical 
and political relationship between the participants of the region that resembles an equation with multiple 
variables to solve. Furthermore, the energy issues at stake make things more difficult. In this regard, there is 
a need to scrutinise each State’s position in order to make objective assessments. 
6. Policies of Riparian States 
Before explaining the subject, it is necessary to clarify the type of delimitation. As it has been 
mentioned in the first part of the paper, there are various types of maritime zones regulated in international 
law. However, in the Eastern Mediterranean, the argument continues with the basis of EEZ. That is to say; 
instead of delimitating territorial waters or contiguous zones, the States mostly have focused on solely EEZ 
so as to create a single maritime boundary between the parties.  
In this regard, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and GCASC has already proclaimed their EEZs either 
concluding agreements or unilateral declaration of EEZ.167 Nevertheless, because of the dual governing 
structure of Cyprus Island, the agreements concluded by GCASC has not been accepted by TRNC since 
their existence and rights are ignored. On the other hand, Turkey also objects the GCASC actions in 
question on the basis of not accepting GCASC as a true representative of the entire island168 and due to its 
guarantor State position over TRNC.169 Following sections will expound the agendas of the riparian States by 
referring to the actions of Turkey. 
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6.1 Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (“GCASC”) 
GCASC is a coastal State in the Eastern Mediterranean region with a coastline of 220 miles. 
Besides, it is one of the member States of the European Union (“EU”) and is a party to both CSC170 and 
UNCLOS171. Its territorial waters are determined as 12 nm,172 its continental shelf is regulated as 200 meters 
or operable depth for exploitation compatible with the CSC,173 and its outer limits of the contiguous zone and 
EEZ are regulated as 24 nm and 200 nm, respectively.174 
GCASC has been recognised as the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and the representative of the whole 
island by international community.175 In this regard, whilst delimitating the aforementioned maritime zones, 
GCASC has not taken into account the rights of TRNC as well as the principle of equity which is the main 
principle for the process of delimitation in international law.176 However, technically the Republic of Cyprus 
does not exist at all because Turkish Cypriots are one of the constituent elements of the Republic and the 
formed partnership of the Republic as Greek and Turkish people of Cyprus in 1960 was broken down in 
1963.177 That is to say; it is incongruous to claim that GCASC is the continuation of the Republic of Cyprus 
by oneself. Accordingly, Turkey and TRNC have not recognised the Republic of Cyprus as the true 
representative of the island; instead, they define the southern part of the island as Greek Cypriot 
administration.178 
 In the subject of delimitating the maritime zones of the island, GCASC has adopted the median line 
principle regardless of the relevant circumstances, unlike Turkey and TRNC.179 In this sense, the Greek 
Cypriot administration submits its claims in the presence of the UN, as a response to Turkey’s objections. 
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Firstly, despite the existence of numerous cases related to the principle of equity, they describe the claims of 
Turkey180 as a vague and unfounded, both in law and in practice.181 Secondly, they further argue that the 
result of applying the equitable principles could lead to deprivation of maritime zones for the GCASC.182 
Lastly, they accuse Turkey of using the statement of “equitable solution”, is included in both Articles 74 and 
83 of UNCLOS, intentionally to bypass the requirement that the delimitation shall be effected by agreement 
on the basis of international law.183 In conclusion, despite the objections of Turkey and TRNC, GCASC has 
signed three delimitation agreements so far with Egypt184, Lebanon (signed but not ratified by Lebanese 
assembly)185 and Israel186 by implementing the median line principle. 
In 2007, GCASC divided its assumed EEZ into 13 exploration blocks covering roughly 19500 square 
miles.187 After that, they finalized three successful offshore licensing rounds, officially awarded most of the 
offshore blocks to some of the best international oil companies in the world such as Italian ENI, French Total, 
American Noble Energy and Royal Dutch Shell.188Accordingly, in late 2011, the Aphrodite field was 
discovered by U.S. firm Noble Energy in Block 12, which estimated to hold between 5 and 8 TCFG.189 
On the other hand, certain blocks in question intersect the zones which subject to multiple EEZ 
claims. In particular, the blocks of 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are part of the assumed EEZ of Turkey, and also, the 
blocks of 2, 9, 10, 12 are partially and 3, 13 are entirely part of the assumed EEZ of TRNC.190As 
counteractions, in 2014 and 2019, Turkey sent its seismic and drilling vessels to the assumed EEZ of TRNC 
in order to protect the rights of TRNC as a guarantor State. Moreover, in early 2018, Italian ENI’s drilling 
vessel Saipem 12000 was obstructed by Turkish military forces in the overlapping area located southwest of 
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the island.191 Subsequently, in 2019, Turkey has sent its drill vessel “Fatih”, sixth-generation ultra-deep-water 
drillship, to the overlapping area for conducting exploration activities under the protection of warships and 
armed unmanned aerial vehicles.192 In return GCASC has issued European arrest warrants for the crew of a 
Turkish drill ship.193 As a result, it can be said that the tension will continue to grow day by day in the Eastern 
Mediterranean unless the unilateral actions are prevented. 
6.2 Greece 
Greece is one of the member States of the EU. It is a party to both CSC194 and UNCLOS195. Greek 
administration determines its territorial waters as 6 nm.196 Moreover, they have a regulation that recognises 
exclusive rights within or outside of its territorial waters up to a depth of 200 meters or an operable depth for 
exploration and exploitation beyond a depth of 200 meters.197 
Unlike other coastal states of the Eastern Mediterranean except for Cyprus Island, Greece does not 
have mainland coasts in the area in question. Although Greece has sovereignty claims over a significant 
proportion of the relevant maritime zones due to the location of its certain islands. Accordingly, the 
Kastellorizo (Meis) island, located in the closer proximity to coasts of Turkey, composes the core of Greek 
strategy. With the help of island at stake, and by using other Greek islands such as Crete, Kashot, Karpathos 
and Rhodes, Greece wishes to form a boundary line between Turkey in order to utter extended claims over 
relevant maritime areas.198Furthermore, if Greece succeeds its strategy and the line in question recognises 
as a coastline of Greece, Turkey will be out of the equation of distribution of the Eastern Mediterranean 
region and Turkey’s maritime zones will be limited with the gulf of Antalya.199In other words, despite having 
the longest coastline (569 miles) in the Eastern Mediterranean area, Turkey might acquire at around 106.189 
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square miles instead of 375.548 square miles.200 In this regard, Greece reiterates its position also 
diplomatically by submitting notes to UN Secretary-General which points out “according to a well-established 
principle of the law of the sea, islands, regardless of their size, have full entitlement to maritime zones 
(continental shelf/EEZ), as other land territory [...] the delimitation of maritime zones between States with 
opposite coasts (both continental and insular) should take place [...] on the basis of the equidistance/median 
line principle”.201 As a result, after having incarcerated Turkey into the Gulf of Antalya, the mentioned 
strategy might pave the way for forming maritime boundaries between Cyprus, Egypt and Greece.202 In this 
sense, it can be said that the following days will bring more confrontation upon considering the ongoing 
trilateral summits between the parties concerned.203 
On the other hand, Greece is one of the three guarantor countries of 204 the Republic of Cyprus.205 
Besides their guarantor relationship, Greece and GCASC are allies that have strong cultural, historical, and 
economic ties. Accordingly, it supports the maritime claims of GCASC as well as advocates that they should 
have common maritime boundaries with GCASC that administer 200 miles of EEZ in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Moreover, Greek authorities have conducting lobbying activities in the presence of both EU 
and UN, and Greek press also plays a significant role in propagating Greek and GCASC claims as well as 
consistently repudiating claims of Turkey and TRNC.206 As a result, it can be said that Greece has a pivotal 
role in resolving the maritime dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
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6.3 Egypt  
With a coastline of 522 miles, The Arab Republic of Egypt has the second largest coastline in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and is a party to UNCLOS.207 The Egyptian administration determines its territorial 
waters as 12 nm208 and defines its sovereignty rights on the continental shelf up to a depth of 200 meters, or 
deeper depending on the exploitability of natural resources of the bottom.209 Moreover, starting in 1990, they 
have adopted a straight baseline method and submitted the relevant coordinates to the UN.210 
Egyptian offshore areas are known as considerably productive in terms of natural resources. In 
2003, the first notable natural gas discovery was made in the Nile Delta region and the following year the 
exploration director of SHELL declared that the region at stake had a rich hydrocarbon potential. 
Furthermore, today’s natural gas estimation is approximately 1.5 TCFG for this area.211 Subsequently, in 
2015, Italian Energy Company ENİ announced that it had made a world-class supergiant gas discovery at its 
Zohr field and the potential of this area is at around 30 TCFG.212 In addition, these fields are located in 
undisputed areas that are not subject to delimitation process between neighbour States. Lastly, apart from 
these discoveries, the process of exploration continues in different areas. 
In 2003, a delimitation agreement signed between the GCASC and Egypt on the basis of median line 
principle.213 However, it cannot be said that the consequences of this agreement were beneficial for Egypt as 
its share is less than it deserves considering the notion of equity.214 Because, if Egyptian administration had 
assessed the relevant circumstances correctly, they would have gained additional 4,633 square miles by 
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concluding an agreement with Turkey.215 Nonetheless, the agreement in question is not binding for Turkey; 
therefore, it does not have any effect on the sovereignty rights of Turkey. That is to say, with this agreement, 
GCASC cannot gain any legitimate rights over overlapping maritime zones. Furthermore, in March 2013, 
Egypt’s first democratically elected president Mohamed Morsi annulled the delimitation agreement between 
Egypt and GCASC considering the interests of Egypt.216 However, after nullification of the agreement, 
Minister of Defence Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took over the administration of the State unlawfully by making a 
military coup in July 2013 and signed an agreement with GCASC to restore its previous EEZ in December 
2013.217 In light of chronology of the events, it can be observed that the relationship between the military 
coup and delimitation agreement seems to be more than a coincidence in terms of dates. 
 On the other hand, upon considering the consensus between Egypt, Cyprus and Greece218, there is 
another risk which threatens the interests of Egypt. It can be said that, if Egypt makes another mistake by 
concluding delimitation agreement with Greece instead of Turkey, on the basis of recognising Greek Islands’ 
full entitlement to maritime zone regardless of their location, size and relevant case law decisions, their 
future loss will be at around 2,857 square miles and it will be against the Egyptian interests.219 
6.4 Lebanon 
Lebanon is another coastal State in the Eastern Mediterranean region with a coastline of 107 miles 
and is a party to UNCLOS220. Its territorial waters are determined as 12 nm.221 
Lebanon and GCASC initiated negotiations regarding the demarcation of maritime areas as early as 
2002.222 Then, an agreement was reached and signed between parties in 2007; however, it was not ratified 
simultaneously.223 After the agreement revealed, the Turkish government started to put full pressure on the 
Lebanese government to not to ratify the agreement, and at the same time, TRNC President Mehmet Ali 
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TALAT took in action224 in the presence of UN.225 As a result, the agreement was not ratified by the 
Lebanese assembly.226 
On the other hand, Lebanon has held its interest in exploring hydrocarbon fields and declaring EEZ. 
In this regard, in 2011, Lebanese assembly enacted the legislation concerning offshore petroleum resources, 
and then submitted a note to the UN Secretary-General, illustrating its maritime jurisdictional areas.227 
Accordingly, this note contained the coordinates of the agreement concluded with the GCASC in 2007. That 
is to say, the veto of the Lebanese assembly over the agreement of 2007 lost its significance, and they 
automatically accepted GCASC as a representative of the entire island.228 
 After the note was submitted to the UN, a brand new delimitation dispute emerged with Israel 
regarding overlapping areas due to the inconsistency of southernmost coordinates in comparison with the 
unratified agreement with the GCASC in 2007 because GCASC and Israel concluded an agreement 
delimiting their maritime boundaries in 2010 by referencing the agreed points in the 2007 Lebanon-Cyprus 
agreement.229 Nevertheless, Lebanon claimed that the agreed points in 2007 did not further meaning except 
for a temporary solution, subject to a future agreement between Lebanon and Israel.230 Moreover, they also 
emphasized that the agreement in question signed just approximately six months after the Israel-Lebanon 
war in order to avoid another conflict against Israel.231 In addition, the overlapping area in question is highly 
important as it is situated close to the Aphrodite and Leviathan gas fields and Lebanon believes that the 
closer proximity strengthens the possibility of having a considerable amount of resources in overlapping 
areas.232 As a result, despite the attempts by the UN and US diplomats to resolve the issue233, no agreement 
has yet been attained between the parties. 
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6.5 Syria 
With a coastline of 95 miles, Syria is a strategically important State located in the middle of energy 
corridors and surrounded by Caspian, Mediterranean and the Red Sea234 and is not a party to UNCLOS. Its 
territorial waters, contiguous zone and EEZ, are determined as 12 nm, 24 nm and 200 nm, respectively.235 
In the subject of delimitating the maritime zones of Syria, there was a diplomatic effort between 
GCASC and Syria, and at the end of 2001 they declared that expected to reach an agreement on the 
delimitation of continental shelf and EEZ; however, no steps have been taken in this direction so far.236 In 
2011, Syrian administration called three separate maritime zones for tender, in order to exploration and 
extraction of oil reserves, however, the northern part of the area in question (30 nm) were in the jurisdiction 
of Turkey.237 Consequently, the attempt of exploration in the overlapping maritime zone was fruitless due to 
the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the collapse of the country's political stability. 
Nine years have passed since the beginning of the civil war, and nowadays the battlefield resembles 
a chessboard that hosts two superpowers, namely, the US and Russia. On the one hand, the United States 
supports the Syrian Democratic Forces (“SDF”) comprised of mostly YPG militants that are Syrian offshoot of 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (“PKK”) against the Assad Regime, which it – Turkey and like most Western 
countries – considers a terrorist organisation. On the other hand, Russia supports the Assad Regime and 
some minor part of the SDG concerning its interests.238 After considering the ongoing situation, it can be said 
that the future delimitation of Syrian maritime zones might not depend on only the judgement of Syrian 
people. In addition, upon revisiting the GCASC’s previous border diplomacy with Syria by introducing itself 
as a representative of the whole island for conducting delimitation negotiations, it can be readily assumed 
that another future attempt would drag the issue to the dead-end due to Turkey and TRNC's opposition. 
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6.6 Israel 
The State of Israel is another coastal State in the Eastern Mediterranean region with a coastline of 
128 miles and is not a party to UNCLOS. Its territorial waters are determined as 12 nm.239 
In the subject of maritime delimitation, Israel concluded an agreement with the GCASC to demarcate 
the northern limits of its maritime areas in 2010240 and later presented a note to the UN Secretary-General 
which included the coordinates of the signed agreement in 2011.241 As aforementioned in the Lebanon 
section, the agreement in question has caused an overlapping problem between Israel and Lebanon that has 
been waiting to tackle. In addition, Turkey and TRNC have not pleased with the agreement since the 
GCASC has addressed as a true representative of the entire island. 
Israel’s exploration journey of offshore natural resources was initiated in the Eastern Mediterranean 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s with a series of drilling242 and resulted in success by discovering fruitful 
gas fields such as Tamar (2009) and Leviathan (2010). Moreover, including fields at stake, Israel’s estimated 
natural gas reserves are approximately 30 trillion cubic feet of gas (TCFG).243 Upon considering the timing of 
Israel-GCASC agreement, it can be seen that the agreement was signed right after the discovery of the 
major gas fields. 
In this region, there has been a well-known conflict still going on between Israel and Palestine; 
however, this conflict mostly evaluated on the basis of land borders and in particular the status of Jerusalem. 
On the other hand, the delimitation of Palestine maritime zones also deserves necessary attention due to the 
existence of Gaza strip which has a 1 TCFG of estimated gas reserves. Furthermore, while making proper 
delimitation, the Noa, Mari-B and Shimshon natural gas fields may cause future conflicts between Palestine 
and Israel since these areas located in right behind the assumed delimitation line established by Israel.244 In 
addition, it is evident that Palestinian government has also right to declare EEZ, and it may bring a new 
                                                 
239 'Territorial Waters Law, 5717/1956, as Amended by the Territorial Waters (Amendment) Law, 5750-1990, 
of 5 February 1990' (Un.org, 1990) 
<https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ISR_1990_AmendedLaw.pdf> 
accessed 15 July 2019. 
240 Ibid (n 186). 
241 'List of Geographical Coordinates for the Delimitation of the Northern Limit of the State of Israel' (Un.org, 
2011)<https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/isr_eez_northernlimit2011.pd
f> accessed 15 July 2019. 
242 The Geophysical Institute of Israel, 'The Levant Basin Offshore Israel: Stratigraphy, Structure, Tectonic 
Evolution and Implications for Hydrocarbon Exploration' (GSI 2008), 1, 5. 
<http://www.gsi.gov.il/_uploads/ftp/GsiReport/2008/Gardosh-Michael-GSI-4-2008.pdf> accessed 15 July 
2019. 
243 Ibid (n 225) 33. 
244 'Overview of Oil and Natural Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean Region' (Eia.gov, 2013) 
<https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/regions_of_interest/Eastern_Mediterranean/easter
n-mediterranean.pdf> accessed 15 July 2019. 
39 
 
conflict between Palestine and Egypt245, and most probably this future demand may affect the GCASC since 
Palestine was not a part of current EEZ delimitation agreement signed by Israel and GCASC.246 As a result, 
there are lots of problems to deal with in order to reach a successful delimitation. 
6.7 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (“TRNC”) 
TRNC is another coastal State in the Eastern Mediterranean region with a coastline of 205 miles. Its 
territorial waters are determined as 12 nm,247and its contiguous zone, continental shelf and EEZ have 
regulated in accordance with international law. According to its regulation while concluding delimitation 
agreements, the principle of equity has to be taken into account.248  
Unlike GCASC, TRNC has not been recognized yet by the international community, except for 
Turkey. Therefore, it has a limited radius of action while defending its rights in the international arena. In this 
regard, Turkey plays a vital role in representing TRNC internationally by being the voice of Turkish Cypriots. 
Nevertheless, regardless of international recognition, they emphasize persistently on all occasions that the 
island has to be represented by both TRNC and GCASC and the natural resources of the island have to be 
distributed equally.249In order to tackle the problem of dichotomy and reunify the island, a comprehensive 
solution plan was prepared by the UN, known as the Annan Plan, Greek and Turkish Cypriots agreed to hold 
referenda on 24 April 2004. According to referenda, while 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of 
the plan, on the other hand, 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots voted against the plan.250In conclusion, the result 
of the referenda is highly remarkable in terms of demonstrating the views of both sides to the issue.   
As it has been mentioned in previous sections, GCASC signed delimitation agreements with Egypt, 
Lebanon and Israel in 2003, 2007 and 2010,251 respectively without taking into consideration the rights of 
TRNC. Moreover, after 2007 it concluded exploration contracts with multinational oil and gas companies for 
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its licenced fields. However, TRNC have also some rights partially or fully over the areas in question. In this 
regard, Turkey and TRNC signed a delimitation agreement in 2011 in order to protect the rights of TRNC,252 
and in 2014, Turkish Petroleum Corporation (“TPAO”) sent Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha Seismic Research 
Ship to start its exploration in the south of Cyprus.253Furthermore, nowadays, TPAO has sent a vessel 
named Yavuz to the northeast of Cyprus, but this time instead of seismic research, the mission of the ship 
will be a deep-water drilling exploration.254 Lastly, due to the tension in the Eastern Mediterranean both 
vessels have been guarded by Turkish warships, which is dubbed as a gunboat diplomacy.255 
7. The Case of Turkey: International Law, Claims and Assessment of the Claims of Turkey 
Under subsequent subheadings, firstly the position of Turkey will be identified regarding the maritime 
zones applications and their delimitation in terms of the Geneva Conventions and UNCLOS. Secondly, 
claims of Turkey regarding the way of delimitation will be explained, and lastly, the applicability of its claims 
will be assessed. 
7.1 The Approach of Turkey Towards to Maritime Zones under International Law 
The codified international law is based on the Geneva Convention and UNCLOS. Even though 
Turkey participates in the meetings of both of them, due to specific reasons, neither the Geneva Convention 
nor UNCLOS is ratified by Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey has regulated some types of maritime zones in its 
waters and also made some modifications on outer limits to meet the needs of geographical circumstances. 
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, despite not being a party to said conventions, Turkey will be able to 
propound its claims by considering internationally accepted rules.256 Turkey has domestic legislation that 
rules the territorial waters257; however, the contiguous zone has not been regulated, yet.258 
Turkey is surrounded by sea on three sides, and because of this, the outer limits of its territorial 
waters have been differentiated. Accordingly, while implementing 6 nm in the Aegean Sea, 12 nm is applied 
                                                 
252 'T.C. The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Turkish Embassy in Washington, D.C.' (Vasington.be.mfa.gov.tr, 
2011) <http://vasington.be.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/ShowAnnouncement/131804> accessed 19 July 2019. 
253 Volkan Ş Ediger, 'Turkey’s First Drilling Vessel Heads to Mediterranean' (Energy Reporters, 2018) 
<https://www.energy-reporters.com/opinion/turkeys-first-drilling-vessel-heads-to-mediterranean/> accessed 
19 July 2019. 
254 Helena Smith, 'Turkey Rejects Claims It Is Drilling Illegally for Gas off Cyprus' (the Guardian, 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/11/turkey-rejects-claims-drilling-illegally-gas-off-cyprus> 
accessed 19 July 2019. 
255 Vasileios P. Karakasis, 'Deciphering Turkey’s Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean - Sen Foundation' 
(Sen-foundation.org, 2019) <http://www.sen-foundation.org/making-sense-international-developments-5/> 
accessed 6 August 2019. 
256 Selami Kuran, Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku (Türkmen 2009), 1, 123. 
257 'The Law Of Territorial Waters: Turkey' (Mevzuat.gov.tr, 1982) 
<http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2674.pdf> accessed 22 July 2019. 
258 Ibid (n 256) 192. 
41 
 
in both Black and Mediterranean Seas.259 In the conference of Geneva, Turkey suggested to add specific 
conditions expressly as an exception; however, it was not accepted.260 Moreover, in the meetings of 
UNCLOS, Turkey stated that 12 nm could not be applied as an outer limit of territorial waters in each and 
every sea due to certain specific geographical differences of the seas.261In conclusion, it can be said that the 
reason behind the objections of Turkey is the complex structure of its coasts, in particular, the Aegean Sea 
and if accepting 12 nm means that its sovereignty rights over the area will be jeopardised.262 
As it has been stated in the continental shelf section, there is no need to proclaim in order to have an 
entitlement of continental shelf. That is to say; every coastal State acquires this right automatically. In this 
regard, Turkey concluded agreements with the Soviet Union263 in 1978264 and with Bulgaria in 1997265in the 
region of the Black Sea since the geographical circumstances enable to make successful delimitation. 
However, yet there has been no agreement signed neither in the Aegean nor the Mediterranean Sea 
regarding the issue. 
After the declaration of EEZs is started to make consistently, the right to declare EEZ gains a 
precedent character. Therefore, whether the ratification of the UNCLOS cannot be considered as a 
prerequisite stage for declaring EEZ.266In this regard, after the EEZ declarations of Soviet Union and 
Romania, Turkey also proclaimed 200 miles EEZ in the Black Sea in 1986.267As in mentioned maritime 
zones, the EEZ also has not implemented in both the Aegean and the Mediterranean Sea.268 
In addition to the reasons for Turkey’s objections regarding the articles of territorial waters, there is a 
need to identify the reasons broadly in terms of other maritime zones and its delimitation methods. As it has 
been mentioned before, Turkey has deemed its geographical circumstances as a top priority. Therefore, 
while negotiating the provisions of UNCLOS, Turkey actively proposes texts included in the principle of 
equity to form the final regime of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, the breadth of the territorial 
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sea, delimitation of the continental shelf, and the EEZ between opposite or adjacent coastal States. Besides, 
Turkey is rigorously opposed to the implementation of giving equal status to the islands due to the multitude 
of islands located in closer proximity to its coasts.269Furthermore, Turkey is also opposed to the way of using 
the term of equitable solution in the wording of Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS as the meaning is left to the 
mutual understanding and in case of not reaching consensus, said articles directly points out the compulsory 
dispute resolution provisions of Part XV of the Convention.270 Lastly, the subject of abuse of rights included 
in Article 300 is a vague concept for Turkey, and the outer limit decisions of Turkey in the Aegean Sea might 
be considered as abuse of rights in terms of Greece since Turkey has taken necessary precautions to keep 
the limits in question.271 As a result, it can be evaluated that the perspective of Turkey as a rational approach 
which enables a radius of action while taking decisions instead of restraining itself with incompatible rules 
might be applied to the issue at stake.   
7.2 The Claims of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and Counter Criticisms 
In the previous sections, the actions of Turkey were broadly discussed. In this regard, it can be 
assessed that the policies of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean have composed of five assertions. The 
first is the implementation of the principle of equity in the maritime delimitation agreements due to the unique 
nature of the Eastern Mediterranean, the second is to refuse the representative function of GCASC for the 
entire island, and in this sense to protect the rights of  TRNC in the area at stake, third is to assert the 
licensed assumed zones of GCASC violates the international law as well as the maritime rights of Turkey in 
the area, fourth is related to the Greek islands that are not eligible to have any EEZ rights, and last but not 
least any concluded agreements without considering the overlapping areas before reaching consensus with 
Turkey and TRNC are deemed to be invalid. Therefore, there is no need to reiterate specific actions of 
Turkey on the basis causality-chronology. Instead, in order to create an objective test ground for the 
following section, Turkish claims will be summarised and analysed by using the views of authors who are not 
the proponents of the Turkish claims. 
Firstly, Ioannides states that there is an inconsistency in Turkey's argument regarding the notion of 
equity.272 Because, while Turkey does prefer the method of equidistance/median line principle for maritime 
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delimitation with Egypt, on the other hand when it comes to delimitation with Greece and GCASC, the 
adopted approach shifts from equidistance method to equitable principles.273 Moreover, Kariotis also points 
out that the same inconsistency by referring to the concluded agreements of Turkey with the Soviet Union 
and Bulgaria in the Black Sea on the basis of the principle of the median line without referencing to the 
special circumstances.274 Besides, these agreements are dubbed as a fatal mistake and an Achilles heel of 
Turkey in its dispute with Greece.275  
Secondly, Ioannides argues that the continental shelf limits of Turkey is putative and defines blocks 
1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, overlapping areas according to Turkey, as a legitimate maritime zones of GCASC.276 With 
the same logic, the author describes the other overlapping areas as a part of the Greek continental shelf, 
and accuses the Turkey of encroachment.277 
Thirdly, the attempts of the Turkish government regarding the protection of the rights of Turkish 
Cypriots are illustrated as contradictory and ostensible.278 Because, if Turkey procures these blocks in 
question, it will affect not only the rights of Greek Cypriots but also Turkish Cypriots negatively due to 
reducing the common natural wealth of the island.279That is to say, according to Ioannides, the actions of the 
Turkish government does not reflect its real intentions. Apart from that, the significance of the maritime 
delimitation agreement between GCASC and Egypt is underlined since the south-western part of the Cyprus 
Island is commented as the primary concern of Turkey.280 In this regard, if Turkey takes any action within the 
scope of said area, it may violate the rights of the parties of the agreement under both customary and 
conventional law.281 Moreover, Ioannides also emphasises that the result of any attempts to nullify the said 
agreement will be fruitless due to the doctrine of executed treaty provisions.282 In other words, after having 
established the boundary line, the legally binding function of the agreement gains an independent character 
apart from the existence of the treaty or its provisions. 
 Fourthly, Charalambous states that Turkey's assertion regarding the Greek island of Kastellorizo is 
contrary to Article 121 of UNCLOS which provides rights to acquire maritime zones to the islands just as 
                                                 
273 Ibid. 
274 Theodore C. Kariotis, 'Hydrocarbons and the Law of the Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications 
for Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey' (2011) 22 Mediterranean Quarterly 45, 55. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid (n 272). 
277 Ibid. 
278 Ibid 3. 
279 Ibid.  
280 Ibid 4. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid. 
44 
 
other land territories.283 Moreover, the author emphasises that the inhabitable feature of Kastellorizo that 
distinguishes the island in question from the uninhabited islet of Filfla284in the Libya/Malta Case285.286On this 
matter, Kariotis states that the Greek government should define its own EEZ by taking Kastellorizo into 
account, and the inhabited character of the island is a crucial point to prevent possible discussions whether it 
has an EEZ.287 In conclusion, Greek island Kastellorizo is considered to be entitled to maritime zones 
beyond the territorial sea,288 which means that the Dodecanesian small island of Kastellorizo, as its 
influence, if recognized, can unite the Hellenic EEZ and Greek Cypriot EEZ.289 
Lastly, the position of Turkey is reiterated by Charalambous that Turkey is neither a party to 
UNCLOS nor submits itself to the jurisdiction of ICJ.290Then, the Turkish stance is described as a major 
impediment to the settlement of the maritime boundaries because of the non-acceptance of any delimitation 
agreements in the Eastern Mediterranean in general.291In order to criticise the non-recognition policy of 
Turkey, GCASC is presented as a legitimate representative of the Cyprus Island, member of EU and UN. 
However, the role of Turkey over the island is determined as an intruder, and in this regard, TRNC is 
regarded as the result of an invasion of Cyprus in 1974.292 That is to say, according to the author, Turkey's 
non-recognition stance is stemmed from its previous unlawful action and with the help of implemented 
strategy, the legitimatised ground is tried to be established by Turkey. In this regard, it can be said that with 
the mentioned interpretation, the base of non-acceptance and non-recognition policies of Turkey is tried to 
be collapsed. 
7.3 Assessment of the Claims of Turkey 
After examining the adopted policies and the actions of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, in this 
section, the question of whether there is a room for grounds for Turkey to carry out these policies in question 
will be scrutinised. Whilst conducting said assessment, firstly the delimitation problem between Turkey-
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Greece and Turkey-GCASC will be focused and questioned, respectively, and lastly, the strength of criticised 
policies of Turkey will be assessed.  
7.3.1 Assessment of the Applicability of Turkish Assertions against Greece 
As it has been mentioned before, Greece wishes to establish maritime boundaries by using the 
location of its islands as basepoints instead of making maritime delimitation between the Greek and Turkish 
mainland. Because, Greece asserts that the two groups of Greek islands, the Cyclades and the 
Dodecanese, are in archipelago formation, and in this sense, it should be considered as a continuation of the 
Greek mainland,293 apart from that Greece also asserts that the Greek islands are eligible to have EEZ under 
Article 121 of UNCLOS. 
On the other hand, Turkey has formulated its defence in light of relevant decisions made by ICJ and 
arbitral tribunals, and also with the well-known international principles. The core of Turkish claims is based 
on the supremacy of geography, and the reverse side rule, the principle of non-encroachment (non-cutting 
off).294 
First, there is a need to underline the fact that the coast of each of the Parties constitutes the starting 
line295and in this regard, courts generally start the delimitation process with a provisional line(median line), 
and after that geographical circumstances will take place such as islands to shifting the line at stake. In 
addition, the islands can indeed be regarded as basepoints only if the location of the islands is close to its 
mainland, namely that coastal islands.296However, the Greek islands Kashot, Karpathos, Rhodes and 
Kastellorizo are located far from its mainland to be considered as basepoints. Thus, Greece cannot 
constitute new relevant coastline by using said islands.297 
Secondly, the decision of the Channel Islands298 introduces a new principle into the literature which 
identifies the location of the island in order to determine the effect of the islands on the provisional line. 
Accordingly, the location of the Channel Islands is accepted as "on the wrong side of the median line"299, and 
except for granting them territorial waters toward the median line, the maritime boundary is drawn without 
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taking into account the Channel Islands.300 Moreover, the decision of Black Sea Case301 also adopts the 
logic of the Channel Islands award. The court ignores Serpents Island of Ukraine where is closer proximity to 
Romanian coastline while determining the basepoints to form the equidistance line and states that if island at 
stake counts as a relevant part of the Ukrainian coast, the result would be judicial refashioning of 
geography.302 Besides, even though the said island does have neither the inhabitable environment nor 
economy, the court does not mention these facts for the reasoning of disregard. That is to say, in particular, 
the position of the island is considered to be the only fact for justification. Therefore, it can be said that Greek 
Islands Kashot, Karpathos, Rhodes and Kastellorizo are on the opposite side of the median line and for this 
reason, they do not have any rights for claiming more than territorial waters303and their economic conditions 
or inhabitable features do not cause an effect on the matter.304 
Lastly, according to mentioned decisions in Non-Encroachment (Non-Cutting Off) section, maritime 
delimitation has to be performed without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the 
other party.305Furthermore, some decisions mainly focus on the cutting off effect stemmed from the 
islands.306Accordingly, the relevant coasts of Turkey are affected both the concave configuration of the Gulf 
of Antalya and the location of the Greek islands in terms of non-encroachment. Therefore, in order to prevent 
such a detrimental effect of Greek islands over Turkish maritime zones as well as main ports, the maritime 
rights of the islands should be limited to territorial waters.307 
In conclusion, it is not possible to evaluate the current actions have been performed by Turkey as 
unlawful or as an infraction of the sovereignty rights of Greece. Instead, it can be considered as enjoying its 
maritime zones with respect to the findings as mentioned earlier. 
7.3.2 Assessment of the Applicability of Turkish Assertions against GCASC 
Turkey and GCASC have two notable problems regarding the delimitations of maritime zones and 
the problems in question affect the entire Eastern Mediterranean. The first one is the issue of overlapping 
areas between them, and the second one is the representation of the Cyprus Island and the protection of the 
TRNC's rights. In this section, the first problem will be examined in terms of Turkey's perspective. 
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As it has been expounded before, GCASC concluded bilateral agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and 
Israel, respectively.308 Whilst GCASC made said agreements, unlike Turkey, a diagonal method was 
implemented instead of the vertical method. That is to say, with this method they increased the numbers of 
neighbour countries to be made agreements as well as the maritime jurisdiction areas.309 After that, 
hypothetical EEZ's of GCASC was divided into 13 blocks; however, the sovereignty rights over certain parts 
of the blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 has been claimed by Turkey as well. 
When determining maritime boundaries, the starting point of the process is to identify the relevant 
coasts of the States. The relevant coasts of Turkey for the delimitation area at stake extend from Muğla 
Deveboynu Cap. to Antalya Gazipaşa. Between these two points, the actual coast length of Turkey is 656 
miles and said coasts' frontal length is 294 miles. On the other hand, the relevant actual coast length of 
GCASC is 32 miles, and the frontal length is 28 miles.310 Accordingly, it can be observed that there is a 
relatively ten times length disparity between the Anatolia coasts and western coasts of GCASC. At this point, 
the principle of proportionality gains importance in terms of the delimitation process. As it has been 
mentioned in the principle of proportionality section, such disparities have been interpreted in favour of the 
State which has a longer coastline. In particular, Libya/Malta Case311 has a significant feature for solving the 
issue. In the mentioned case, the coastal length ratio between the States was determined to of 8: 1 in favour 
of Libya312 and the median line was withdrawn 18 miles towards north against Malta.313 Moreover, St. Pierre 
and Miquelon314 and Nicaragua/Colombia315 decisions emphasise the necessity of preventing the island's cut 
off effect over a parallel frontal projection of relevant coasts of mainland.316 Besides, Guinea/Guinea-
Bissau317 decision underlines the importance of the openings of the ports.318  
When considering the 10: 1 coastal length ratio, and the openings of Antalya and Mersin ports which 
are the most important ports of the area,319 it can be argued that the maritime boundaries between Turkey 
and GCASC have to be determined by taking special circumstances into account and making an agreement 
based on the principles of equity, instead of implementing the median line approach solely in order to reach 
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an equitable solution. Therefore, Turkey claims that the maritime boundary has to be formed towards the 
east at 032° 16' 18" E longitude which is closer to the western coasts of GCASC and it will follow said 
longitude towards the south until the median line between the relevant coasts of Egypt and Turkey. Also, the 
border in question shall be modified in favour of GCASC while intersecting the external territorial waters 
border of GCASC.320 
Despite the reasonable grounds of Turkey, at first sight, it seems as GCASC is incarcerated into its 
western territorial waters with this argument. Nevertheless, upon revisiting the vertical delimitation approach 
of Turkey and the diagonal approach of GCASC. It can be observed that Turkey has already narrowed down 
its claims by taking the said approach. In other words, if Turkey pursues a policy like GCASC, Turkey will 
have a chance to increase the numbers of neighbour countries to be made delimitation agreements such as 
Israel and Lebanon in addition to current ones (Greece, Syria, GCASC and TRNC). Indeed, Turkey may 
expand its EEZ claims with the help of this perspective from 55.985 to 69.535 square miles.321In conclusion, 
Turkey’s plan can be interpreted as relatively more than fair. 
7.3.3 The General Policy of Turkey and its Applicability 
The summary of Turkish claims and its criticisms were expounded in previous sections, and in this 
section, the other criticisms in question will be tried to be responded. 
After examining the issues related to Turkey-Greece and Turkey-GCASC, it can be said that there is 
no obstacle for making maritime delimitation agreement between the opposite coasts of Turkey and Egypt. 
Indeed, despite the Greek assertions regarding overlapping areas and the prevention of establishing 
delimitation agreement between Turkey and Egypt, it can be argued that even Greece does not believe in its 
assertions.322 Because during the bilateral maritime delimitation talks were made by Egyptian-Greek sides in 
Cairo on 20 June 2009, Egypt informed the Greek committee about initiating the similar talks with Turkey; 
however, the Greek side did not show any sign of protest regarding the issue and two days later Turkish and 
Egyptian sides discussed the same issues in Cairo323. That is to say; the mentioned occasion can be 
evaluated as a tacit acceptance of Greece for Turkish claims. 
According to Turkey, a possible Turkish-Egyptian maritime border shall be determined by solely 
adopting the median line method. Because both countries have similar coastlines 569 and 522 miles, 
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respectively, and there are no special circumstances to modify the median line.324 However, this approach is 
criticized as inconsistency by certain authors due to contrary to pursued policies of Turkey in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. In order to analyse Turkish behaviour, the dynamic character of maritime delimitation should 
be remembered, and in this sense, case law has frequently underlined that there is no particular recipe to 
implement every single case beginning from the decision of North Sea Case325. Furthermore, before the 
matter of Turkey-Egypt maritime delimitation, Turkey has already applied this method for the maritime 
delimitations with its neighbours in the Black Sea since there are no special circumstances to alter the 
median line. In conclusion, there is no international law that requires that after applying any delimitation 
method, a State is bound to this method in all circumstances, regardless of the specific characteristics of 
each case. That is to say, thinking the opposite way and making one-sided criticisms means that the denial 
of entire case law. 
Turkish policy regarding the overlapping areas between Turkey and GCASC is also criticised as a 
contradictive matter since it will cause to reduce the wealth of the entire island. In other words, if taking the 
equal right demands of TRNC over the island into consideration, possible consequences will not be 
beneficial for TRNC. Moreover, the argument in question is based on the assumption that Turkey has to 
sacrifice its rights in return for TRNC’s good in every case. However, according to Turkey, TRNC is an 
independent State and status of Turkey is limited to be guarantor State. In this regard, Turkey is responsible 
for defending logical and lawful assertions of TRNC as a guarantor State and for this reason, Turkey will be 
able to free to protect its lawful rights against any State whether its allies or not. In addition, there is also 
another argument about mentioned criticism. Accordingly, it argued that the Turkish endeavours will not 
result in success since Egypt and GCASC have already concluded a delimitation agreement that set the 
boundaries of the area at stake, and there is no chance to nullify the agreement due to the doctrine of 
executed treaty provisions. This time, an argument at stake is based on the well-known doctrine, however, in 
order to refer to said doctrine, parties have to constitute a valid agreement by fulfilling the essential elements 
of the contract. In this regard, the parties do not have authority over the subject of the agreement, which 
means that the said agreement can be considered as not being born from the beginning. 
Lastly, Turkey’s non-acceptance and non-recognition approaches are criticised as a major 
impediment to the settlement of the maritime boundaries. At first glance, Turkey seems to be a bully who will 
always create problems until its desires are fulfilled. However, the other side of the coin tells an entirely 
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different story. In this sense, Turkish actions can be explained as an effort to prevent possible future 
delimitation-based conflicts. Accordingly, Turkey has been a strong advocate of not concluding any bilateral 
agreements before resolving the conflicts and claims. If the goal is to achieve a sustainable and fair solution, 
the foundation of the structure must be concrete, which can be possible by avoiding problems from the 
beginning. In conclusion, it can be said that being a wise man or a bully is only a matter of perspective. That 
is to say; accusing Turkey being a bully or an obstacle can be considered as a continuation of one-sided and 
biased perspective. 
8. Conclusion 
In this study, the structure of the content was divided into two chapters. In Chapter I, the basic 
concepts, general rules and the principles/methods of maritime delimitation were explained to establish the 
base of the argument of this study. Afterwards, in Chapter II, the region of the Eastern Mediterranean was 
scrutinised in particular considering the policies of all participants in order to familiarize each States’ agendas 
and to observe the position of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean clearly. Finally, the applicability of 
Turkish claims and the strength of its grounds were assessed in light of counter criticisms. 
After assessing the justifications of Turkish claims and the relevant criticisms against them by taking 
into account the case law, it can be said that the grounds are solid and the criticisms are shallow. 
Nevertheless, most of the States apart from Turkey and TRNC continue to take actions without considering 
the rights of other States with respect to concluded unlawful bilateral delimitation agreements, instead of 
having followed the famous proverb “a fault confessed is half redressed” and making necessary adjustments 
to form their policies by recognising the legitimate demands of Turkey and the existence of TRNC. The 
remarkable point is that before starting the exploration and drilling activities of Turkey with its owned vessels, 
the other States did ignore the previous reactions of Turkey by underestimating the Turkish capability of 
taking necessary precautions. Indeed, Turkey has a significant military power and adequate resources to be 
a part of the equation. Accordingly, after Turkey starts to play others’ game under the reciprocity principle, 
Turkey is accused of conducting gunboat diplomacy326 and violating international law.  
In other respects, the EU327 and the US328 consistently make unfortunate statements about their 
disturbances related to violation of assumed EEZ of GCASC and try to put pressure on Turkey to stop its 
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activities. At this point, there is a need to underline the subject once again that all of the demands over the 
area have to be considered as claims not facts, and treated to be equally, in this sense neither EU nor US is 
authorities to decide the boundaries of the Eastern Mediterranean. Most probably, these statements are 
stemmed from the energy needs of the EU and protecting the interests of US energy companies. That is to 
say; at this point, overlapping areas belong to no one, and the issue has to be assessed objectively in the 
light of universal rules and case law regardless of thoughts of external elements. In this regard, said 
statements could be considered as hypocritical and interest-oriented. 
The recognition of TRNC is also a significant issue in order to tackle the delimitation problem. 
Indeed, TRNC is the constituent element of the RoC according to the agreement concluded in 1960. 
Although the international community has recognised GCASC as RoC, there is no chance to talk about RoC 
without TRNC due to the said agreement (ipso iure) and sovereignty of TRNC over the northern part of 
Cyprus (ipso facto). In this regard, the actions of Turkey for protecting the rights of TRNC can be considered 
as reasonable. In addition, unlike the common perception, Turkey and TRNC have always demonstrated 
cooperative attitudes and left the dialogue channels openly for contributing the solution.329  
As a result, although Turkey is neither a party to international conventions nor submits itself to the 
jurisdiction of ICJ, it can be said that the grounds of Turkey are well-organised and contemplated in light of 
case law as well as international principles. In this regard, from what has been discussed above so far, we 
may conclude that the policies of Turkey pursued in the Eastern Mediterranean have a high degree of 
applicability, and unless reaching the mutual consensus between all parties, there will be no chance for the 
area at stake to be delimited successfully. 
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 Çubukçuoğlu S, 'Cyprus and Turkey: The EEZ Delimitation Dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean - Part I' 
(The Fletcher School/University of Tufts 2014) 1 – 19. 
<https://www.academia.edu/9532415/Cyprus_and_Turkey_The_EEZ_Delimitation_Dispute_in_the_East
ern_Mediterranean_-_Part_I> accessed 18 July 2019 
 Dundua N, 'Delimitation Of Maritime Boundaries Between Adjacent States' (Un.org, 2006) 
<https://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/dundua_0
607_georgia.pdf> accessed 17 June 2019 
 Eiran E, Mitchell G, ‘The Gas Effect: Assessing Hydrocarbon Development’s Impact upon Eastern 
Mediterranean Politics' (Euromesco.net, 2018) <https://www.euromesco.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Joint-Policy-Study_The-Eastern-Med_New-Dynamics-and-Potential-for-
Cooperation-1.pdf> accessed 13 July 2019. 
 Gürel A, Mullen F, Tzimitras H, 'The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions And Future 
Scenarios' (Peace Research Institute Oslo 2013) <https://sapientaeconomics.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/The-Cyprus-hydrocarbons-issue-ENG-WEB.pdf> accessed 16 July 2019 
57 
 
 Lokita S, 'The Role of the Archipelagic Baselines in Maritime Boundary Delimitation' (Un.org, 2010) 
<https://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/lokita_091
0_indonesia.pdf> accessed 1 July 2019 
 Ioannides N, 'Turkish Maritime Claims Offshore Cyprus' (Cyprus Center for European and International 
Relations (CCEIA) 2017) <https://cceia.unic.ac.cy/wp-content/uploads/EMPN_18.pdf> 1- 9 accessed 24 
July 2019  
 Ouki M, 'Egypt - A Return to a Balanced Gas Market?' (The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 2018) 
<https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Egypt-a-return-to-a-balanced-gas-
market-NG-131.pdf> accessed 16 July 2019 
 Ratner M, 'Natural Gas Discoveries In The Eastern Mediterranean' (Congressional Research Service 
2016) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44591.pdf> accessed 20 July 2019 
 Sandikli A, Budak T, Ünal B, 'Energy Exploration In The Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey ("Doğu 
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